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The present article is divided into four parts.' The first part deals 
with the theoretical and conceptual framework for debating the role 
of the state in a developmental perspective. The second part consists 
of an empirical analysis which emphasizes the role of the state in 
Thailand and in the context of democracy and democratization at 
the regime-level, civil society and the interlinkage with external 
factors. The third part of the article provides a brief comparative 
perspective on the events in 1973-1976 - the period where popular 
forces toppled an authoritarian regime - and the latest events in 
1992 where the Suchinda junta was forced to resign.' Finally, some 
tentative prospects on state and democracy in the Thai context are 
offered. 
Due to their dynamic growth in the last few decades, the question 
of analyzing the development of Southeast Asian countries has 
caught the attention of scholars. Of all the countries of the region, 
Thailand offers, with its economic results and political evolution, a 
showcase which can contribute to a better understanding of 
development processes. 
In their bestseller Megatrends Year 2000, John Naisbitt and Patricia 
Aburdene argue that Thailand, along with South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, ought to be considered East Asia's fifth 
d r a g ~ n . ~  Asian as well as Western international economists and 
investors hail Thailand as the next member of the exclusive club of 
Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs). The Asian Wall Street 
Journal describes "the Thai stock market as one of the world's 
hottest," and the International Herald Tribune regularly publishes 
special features about Thailand's economy as one with the highest 
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growth rates in the world. This is indeed exemplified by the 
following statistics: from 1965-80 the average annual growth rate of 
GNP was 7.2 percent and during the international recession period 
from 1980-90 the annual GNP growth rate was 7.3 percenL4 There 
has been no negative growth since 1958 when it was plus 3 percent. 
Thus, growth has been about 7-8 percent yearly and only on three 
occasions did it drop to 5 percent (1971-72, 1982 and 1985).5 
Thailand's GNP in real terms rose from US$4 billion in 1965 to US$ 
41.7 billion in 1986. 
Thailand's economic success is based on low wages and access to 
a huge reservoir of cheap labour, thus offering a favourable climate 
for foreign investment. Simultaneously, in comparison to most other 
Southeast Asian countries, personal freedom is claimed to be more 
developed. For investors, the question of political stability is as 
important as economic factors. Despite insurgency and occasional 
violent protests, some of the ASEAN nations have been ruled by 
long-lasting regimes - Lee in Singapore, Suharto in Indonesia and 
Marcos in the Philippines. Only in Thailand have governments been 
short-lived and investors seem to be accepting that even with 
changes of government brought about by coup d'etat "there is little 
threat to in~estment."~ Furthermore government expenditure has 
moved away from regional and rural development in the direction 
of creating a suitable environment for major industrial e~pansion.~ 
This has lead some observers to claim that in the rush to 
industrialize "Thailand seems determined to become a NIC. With 
that conventional objective, it is ignoring its greatest potential - 
services, Thailand could be the first country to bypass 
industrialization completely and evolve from an agricultural 
economy right into a service economy, a SSE - Straight to Services 
Economy."' The former president of the National Economic and 
Social Development Board (NESDB), Dr. Snoh Anakul, has a more 
modest definition of the "Thai Miracle" and coined the acronym 
NAISE, which stands for Newly Agricultural and Industrialized 
Service Ec~nomy.~ 
On the surface the Thai economy appears as a sunshine example 
and showcase of how an open liberal economy with emphasis on 
market forces strengthens economic growth as measured in macro- 
economic terms. Furthermore, the lesson for other developing 
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countries is related to the role of the state and other political factors; 
i.e., the apparent significance of a non-interventionist laissez-faire 
economic policy-making while maintaining a soft authoritarian and 
developmental perspective based on coercive and incorporative 
capacities. 
In an address to the US Congress the Thai ambassador to 
Washington, Kasem S. Kasemsri, explained that Thailand is 
currently in a difficult structural transformation process of trying to 
develop a harmonious society. For the first time ever, the value of 
Thailand's export of manufactured goods exceeds the level of 
agricultural output. This process is reflected in a high level of 
urbanization and structural changes in the rural sector: 
This also means greater demands on the government to 
provide social services to this mass population and to ensure 
that rapid economic growth proceeds rapidly enough to 
prevent the revolution of rising expectations from 
undermining the traditional foundation of Thai society. This 
is the raison dr6tre of all these five-year plans. The sixth of 
these plans ... calls for restructuring the Thai economy toward 
more industrialization led by exports. This is the traditional 
route of past success by those four Asian "tigers" - Taiwan, 
South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong - all of which 
emulate Japan, the greatest economic trailblazer of Asia. In 
pursuing a similar strategy, Thailand now finds herself flying 
after these countries in a "flying geese formation", to borrow 
the Japanese term for these Asian NICs, right into the walls of 
U.S. protecti~nisrn.'~ 
These remarks denote the importance of the concept of the capitalist 
developmental state developed by Chalmers Johnson in his study 
of Japan as having been the model for South Korea and Taiwan. It 
also raises the question, whether similar elements of state policy- 
making are to be found in the Thai context,'' i.e., a specific 
industrialization strategy as emphasized in the Japanese model.12 
Johnson argues that in the Japanese variant of capitalism, 
"markets are emphasized as a source of growth rather than of short- 
run efficiency, and a primary role of government is to supply 
incentives to promote growth through markets. The perspective 
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motivating Japanese policy is explicitly dynamic and developmental. 
From this perspective, the competitive advantage of a nation's 
producers in world markets is created by policy rather than given 
by immutable resource and technological endowments."13 
The central element of this theory, is not that the state intervenes 
because all states do. The question is, how does this intervention 
take place! 
There is no doubt that Thailand is among the fastest growing 
industrializing economies ever recorded and that it is politically 
characterized by soft or quasi-authoritarian structures. Taking a 
combined look at the developmental state approach and Robert 
Wade's notion of "a guided market economy,"14 which in fact 
criticizes Chalmers Johnson for putting too much emphasis on 
institutions and bypassing the role of the state, an important 
question emerges: Has the state in Thailand the same kind of 
autonomy in economic policy-making, which is found in Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, or are societal and market forces merged 
with the state as in Indonesia? What are the obstacles to a 
democratic regime-form, and democratization from below? 
Theories of State and Democracy 
It has not yet been possible to establish an adequate theory 
explaining the economic, political, social or cultural pre-conditions 
required for the advancement of democratic development in 
different societies. 
Nevertheless, one of the most distinctive political phenomena on 
the global scale has been a movement from authoritarian to more 
democratic regime-forms in the last 10-20 years. This has been 
observable not only in the former USSR and Eastern Europe, but 
also in Third World societies such as Taiwan, Brazil and a number 
of African states.15 Accordingly, the "transition to democracy debate" 
has attracted the attention of political scientists as well as policy- 
makers. 
In this paper it is suggested that the transition to democracy, at 
least in the case of Thailand, is determined by state control rather 
than by the forces of civil society or the business sector. 
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Democracy and democratization as suggested in this article are 
connected with the state level in the following four ways:16 First, 
democracy is related to the regime-form. Second, the state is related 
to the mode of production and macro-economy in general, both at 
the national and international level. Third, state power understood 
as the ruling classes' dominance of the political, ideological and 
cultural levels, and finally, state form as the hegemonic relationship 
inside the dominant bloc or class which possesses state power. At 
the same time the question of the functioning of the state applies to 
the extractive capacity, coercive capacity, incorporative capacity, and 
the capacity to manipulate the operative elements in the 
(macro)economic system. These capabilities, I suggest, have a great 
influence on the distribution of political power as they are 
determining the strength of the state in the domestic and 
international context as well. 
However, the problematique of capacity versus autonomy of the 
state is an empirical matter which is hypothesized to be one of the 
most important determinants with regard to the regime-form and 
as such linked to the problem of democracy versus authoritarianism. 
The same question has relevance for the level of the democratization 
process at the actor level as mentioned above. 
The framework for the empirical study of state and democracy 
must include a tripode historical analysis of the international aspect, 
the capacity of the state and a description of the emerging classes. 
The Historical State and Political Processes in  Siam 
The questions to be answered are why did Siam develop mainly 
along anti-democratic lines and what is the explanation for the non- 
participation of the population in the societal and the production 
context? Allegories like "land of smile", and the anthropological 
term of the "loosely structured social system",17 have been used as 
explanations for a widely claimed specific political culture in 
Thailand. Similarly Chai-Anan asserts that independence meant that 
the country did not experience the imposition and transfer of 
institutions from the West that took place in many developing 
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countries.18 To answer these questions and examine these statements 
we must turn to history. In 1971, Norman Jakobs made a 
comparative study between Japan and Thailand. Like Thailand, 
Japan escaped colonialism. The two countries share a high degree 
of cultural homogeneity and a strong national identity.19 The way 
both countries prevented direct colonization was, as I will show in 
the following with emphasis on Thailand, identical. In Japan the 
system of ministries and agencies came into being well before the 
political parties, the constitution, and the parliament. As Jakobs 
argues, as different from the United States, "these ministries were 
not created to be 'civil servants', or to provide regulation of private 
concerns, or to supply jobs for party loyalist, but rather to guide 
Japan's forced development in order to forestall incipient 
colonization by Western  imperialist^."^^ The administrative and 
bureaucratic praxis was characterised by "vertical administration2'." 
Interestingly, many observers at that time were sure, that "Siam 
would develop while Japan would not."" 
It is well documented that capitalist economic and social 
development in Siam started with the opening to international trade 
in 1850, resulting in the formation of important production factors, 
such as financial capital, labour and management. The expansion of 
agricultural output was mainly due to an increase in planted area. 
Revenue derived from domestic production and from exports were, 
however, mostly remitted out of the country, thus implying that the 
Thai economy at that time was likely to become an economic colony 
of European and Western co~ntries.'~ The most important 
institutional import in the realm of colonialism, however, is 
indicated by Hanks, "The formation of the Thai state had to await 
the nineteenth century when both the idea and reality of a nation 
state was introduced from abr~ad." '~ 
In another comparison between the Meiji reconstruction in Japan 
and the Chakkri reforms in Siam, Benedict Anderson argues that 
especially on one point the response of Siam to the colonial threat 
was quite different from that of the Japanese: 
Squeezed between British Burma and Malaya, and French 
Indochina, he' [King Chulalongkorn] devoted himself to a 
' 
shrewd manipulative diplomacy rather than attempted to 
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build a serious war machine (A Ministry of War was not 
established until 1894). Chulalongkorn tried to emulate the 
state and development model along the lines from the colonial 
'beamtenstaaten' in Dutch East India, British Malaya, and 
Raj .25 
Furthermore, the Chakkri reforms meant the official abolishment of 
the Sakdina systemz6 and the rationalizing and centralizing of royal 
government, eliminating traditional semi-autonomous tributary 
statelets, and promoting economic development along colonial 
lines.27 Together with the strong centralization of the state apparatus 
a powerful army was developed whose primary function was to 
maintain internal stability and control revolts against internal 
colonialism as well as other reactions to the centralizing  reform^.'^ 
The dominant position the military has played in Thai politics since 
the 1932 coup can be traced back to the Chakkri  reform^.'^ 
The most important example of how the colonial administration 
functioned in Bangkok was Chulalongkorn's decree on massive 
import of single, young Chinese males. The Chinese were meant to 
be a sort of buffer between the King and the nobles on one side and 
the rest of the population on the other. As Wyatt notes, "In 1910 
there was not one, but two SiamsM30 and the Chinese became the 
"pariah entreprene~rship."~' 
The main targets of the 1932 coup were the old ruling monarchy 
and the internal private sector groups, mostly of Chinese or Sino- 
Thai origin, who generally lacked a basic relationship to the Thai 
population. The soldiers and civilians behind the coup understood 
this political act as the first real break with colonialism, which was 
symbolized in "The National Anthem after the revolution which 
says Thailand enjoys complete sovereignty because of the 
rev~lution."~~ The economy was to be delinked from Western 
influence and a welfare state "directing the economy towards 
meeting national needs" was to be e~tablished.~~ In other words a 
reassertion of Thai interests with an anti-foreign element. 
However, today the importance of the ethnic factor - is not to be 
denied as most Thai banks are owned by the descendants of 
immigrant Chinese. Similarly, the Chinese serve as points of entry 
into the Thai market for Japanese firms.34 Indeed, the dominant 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt 
position the Chinese have played in the Thai economy together with 
the military's dominant position in the state apparatus can be traced 
back to the reforms initiated by the Thai king. This had grave 
consequences for the development of the country's politics. 
The view of Siam, and later Thailand, as a nation with a specific 
peaceful political culture, has been one of the explanations as to 
why there has been no break with autocratic rule in Thailand. It is 
known to be erroneous. Various sources have pointed to occasional 
outbursts of violence throughout the past on the part of the state 
and the army. Hewison and Tambiah provide a picture of history 
with peasant and worker rebellions, strikes, ethnic and tribal 
upheavals brutally s~ppressed.~~ 
The military violence against the democratic movement during 
the May 1992-events in Bangkok was not the first example of state- 
created repression and intra-rivalry among the bourgeoisie, 
politicians and the Thai military. Struggles among farmers in the 
rural areas and crude oppression on the part of the state since the 
democratic period from 1973 to 1976 have likewise been 
documented. But because of the difficulty to monitor the specific 
events and find witnesses and sufficient source material it remains, 
however, to be shown exactly who were the forces behind each 
specific event.36 
The following points are of importance: Because of the lack of a 
total break with absolutism, civil society is still very weak. 
Consequently Thai political culture is characterized by a population 
showing a strong degree of identification with the bureaucracy, the 
military, the state (which is actually part of the military and vice 
versa), the nation, the king, the monarchy, and religion. It provides 
the state and associated institutions with a monopoly of legitimacy 
rarely found to such an extent elsewhere. Moreover, perceived 
problems of insurgency and threats to national security have 
strengthened military and paramilitary social forces and strongly 
influenced public policy and forms of social control.37 
The model of "internal colonialism" (or center-periphery relations) 
in the late nineteenth century has been rejuvenated since the early 
1960s under the name of national security and de~elopment.~~ The 
weak development of civil society combined with the center- 
periphery relation has meant that long-term projects of 
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constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy have largely been 
rhetorical, or have been initiated only to be undone and then 
restarted after periods of more intense authoritarian rule. The 
extreme polarization between center and periphery has resulted in 
a social transformation. As Suchart notes, "Bangkok and the Central 
Region earned more than half the country's GDP throughout the 
period 1961-1984. Bangkok alone increased its share of GDP from 
22.7 in 1961 to 36.3 percent in 1984, at the expense of other 
regions."39 Over 75 percent of corporate tax revenues come from the 
metropolitan region. Almost every per capita index of progress - 
telephones, light bulbs, doctors, hospital beds, motor cars and the 
like - show a favoured Bangkok that, literally, puts the rest of the 
country to shame.40 
Bangkok has a more complex social structure than is found 
elsewhere in the country. It retains remnants of the old hereditary 
royalty and nobility, of which some members are extremely wealthy 
as a result of ownership of large tracts of real estate in the greater 
Bangkok metropolitan area. Today, however, two elites - the 
bureaucratic-military body which controls the government and the 
capitalist class which controls the major industries, trading firms, 
and financial institutions - run the country. Although the vast 
majority of the capitalist elite members appear to be of Chinese 
descent, because of assimilation and personal identification as Thai, 
they no longer possess the ethnic distinctiveness of their ancestors. 
Similarly, while most members of the bureaucratic-military elite are 
of Thai origin, an increasing number (perhaps as many as a quarter 
to a third) are Sino-Thai. These people no longer define their 
interests in the same ethnic terms as did their predecessors in the 
pre-World War I1 period. But regardless of the decline of ethnic 
tension and considerable intermarriage between the bureaucratic- 
military and capitalist elites, and although many individuals 
belonging to the former sit on the board of corporations owned or 
managed by members of the latter, these two elites still have 
distinctive interests that lead to periodic conflicts between them. 
Debates over the devaluation of the Baht in the 1980s provide such 
an example. Although business leaders supported devaluation 
because they thought it would stimulate exports and encourage the 
purchase of domestic products over imported goods, many in the 
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bureaucracy and especially in the military opposed it because such 
a measure would increase the cost of imported arms, considered 
crucial to maintaining power, to an almost prohibitive level.41 
Deyo's study helpsto explain the underlying mechanism which has 
been used to exclude the farmers and workers from participating in 
political power relations. At the level of decision-making he 
identifies this pattern as developmental paternalism said to be the 
structural foundation for East Asia's industrialisation: 
The political and economic strategies of East Asian elites draw 
moral strength from two closely related sets of values. The 
first of these, centered on paternalism, invokes the moral 
authority of leadership that both defines and pursues national 
(vs. sectoral) interests through bureaucracy and public 
pronouncement. The second, asserts the efficiency of such 
leadership through its proven material consequences for the 
public wealth. Economic development is the chosen measure 
of national welfare and thus a crucial basis for political 
legitimacy. Development paternalism, the composite of these 
two legitimating principles, justifies political exclusion and 
authoritarian rule as necessary for continuing high levels of 
growth. Alternative legitimating principles are effectively 
excluded from the moral domain of public disc~urse.~' 
Even though Deyo's analysis concentrates on Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore, the two main elements of his "developmental 
paternalism" concept apply equally to the case of Thailand. A 
number of studies by Thai scholars confirm this point.43 It is 
developmental paternalism which provides the legitimizing basis for 
the exclusion of civil society and justification for the periods of 
massive repression, evident before 1973 and after 1976. 
Under such conditions, legitimate or claimable space for more 
democratization and alternative or participatory approaches to 
development has been impossible. Oppositional ideas and forms of 
organization have been severely restricted. This is especially the 
case for the poor and the disadvantaged rural producers, who form 
the majority of the population. 
The specifity of Thai political and economic life is connected with 
the rise of the ethnic Chinese together with the emergence of a 
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group of civil-military bureaucrats. The former originally fulfilled 
the role of agents for royal capital accumulation and later "pariah 
entrepeneurs." The bureaucrats emerged as a by-product of the 
creation of an absolute state and as substitute for the missing Thai 
bourgeoisie. These two groups formed the layers behind the 
evolution of a tripode structural collaboration between the Chinese 
business elite, the Thai civil-military bureaucracy and foreign 
capital. The alliance arose as a result of the Chakkri reforms. 
The Long Wave of Paternalism and 
Developmentalism 
The first military coup in Siam, which changed the name of the 
country to Thailand in 1932 and introduced a flag and a national 
anthem, is normally referred to as "the revolution." The coup 
ushered in an era of rule by bureaucrats without subjection to the 
authority of a traditional monarch nor to the controls of formal 
institutions legitimized by the idea of "popular sovereignty". This 
problem of legitimacy plagued political leaders and has been the 
main characteristic of Thai political culture ever since. 
Thus concepts like nation, religion, monarchy on the one hand 
and constitution and democracy on the other compete for position 
as legitimizing symbols. They have been used as circumstances 
dictate by the same leaders at different times to justify bureaucratic 
and military dominance of the polity.44 But the most important 
result of the 1932 coup was the expansion of profit making 
a~t iv i t i es .~~  After the 1932 revolution the state began to promote an 
industrial sector with the goal of establishing a self-sufficient 
economic system. However, in reality the industrial sector was first 
created after the 1958 coup on the basis of an alliance between the 
influential Chinese business community and the political leaders of 
the coup. 
The initial main revolutionary target of the 1932 coup was the 
monarchy and groups in the private sector mostly of Chinese origin, 
who generally lacked a basic relationship with the Thais.46 A 
constitution and a parliamentary system of government were 
adopted. However, this constitutional idealism gradually eroded 
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into formalistic constitutionalism subsequently reflecting more 
accurately a shift in the regime-form from absolutism to "Thai-style 
demo~racy".~~ Hence, the 1932 revolution - and this was to be the 
pattern of subsequent coups as well - far from being a democratic 
or a mass movement "was the replacement of one oligarchy by 
another."48 In fact, it was a change in the formal government 
structure, i.e., a revolution within the ruling elite. In consequence 
the monarchy was not abolished. Its powers were subjected to 
constitutional limitations, and representative institutions were 
established. But since the king continued to "reign", this most 
important symbol of legitimacy was retained and as it has been 
argued by one observer, "those who exercised power after the coup 
did not have to face the problem that most leaders of coups d16tat 
have: establishing their legitimacy in the minds of that portion of 
the population that is politically consci~us."~~ 
The next important coup to be mentioned, is the "Sarit revolution" 
in 1958. Its aim was to overthrow the traditional political system 
inherited from the 1932 revolution and to seek modernization and 
economic progress on the basis of Thai values and culture.50 The 
"thaification" of the political system meant the promotion of the 
symbolic triangle based on the three ideals - King, Religion and 
Nation, that is to say a reinstatement of the authority of the king. 
As Thak notes, "In his concept of the modern Thai state, the king 
was to be recovered as symbolizing the spirit of the people, and 
their past and their tradition; Buddhism was to be embraced by all 
as the source of social morality and ethics."51 The objective of the 
regime was to pursue a coherent national development strategy 
involving an increased role of the state in promoting this particular 
kind of development through the formation and implementation of 
various reformist policies and programs.52 In this context Sarit held 
Western constitutional democracy to be inappropriate because it 
was an obstacle to economic de~elopment.~~ Hence, the strategy was 
meant to enhance the regime's ability to function as a paternalistic 
system: the final goal of development and modernization was seen 
as essentially facilitating administration of society.54 It happened on 
behalf of participation, political mobilization, and the building of 
new political institutions. 
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The goals of the new development policy and the new role of the 
state could only be accomplished through intensive repression of 
the p o p ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  This was very much in line with the interests of 
the Sino-Thai bourgeoisie and as a representative of the Bangkok 
Bank said in a press release: 
We have found from past experience that whenever trade 
unions are allowed ... they fall into the hands of undesirable 
elements who use the trade unions as a tool to subvert the 
democratic working of the government. Therefore, for security 
reasons, it has been found necessary to prevent the 
functioning of trade unions.56 
The conclusion of the bank was, that the best mechanism to prevent 
trade unions was through state coercion. 
Interestingly, the new role of the assimilated Chinese bourgeoisie 
was a reversion of its former position, as a buffer group between 
the monarchy and the people, to that of a kind of go-between 
between bureaucratic and foreign capital.57 As in 1932 the Sino-Thai 
played the overwhelmingly dominant role in internal business 
activities and as the link to the world market through connections 
in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and China, not to mention the 
Chinese communities in the United States and Europe. 
Consequently, the underlying cause of the nationalist economic 
course, which began with the 1932 coup d'etat, was not internal 
factional rivalry;58 on the contrary it was the result of class struggle, 
with ethnic and nationalist aspects, between the Thai civil-military 
bureaucracy and the Sino-Thai bourgeoisie. 
Historically, the mixture of class, ethnic and nationalist conflicts 
brought about momentums of thaification versus alliances between 
the two groups. The anti-Chinese thaification policies created in 
reality the basis for a triple alliance. This construction can be 
defined as a symbiotic but asymmetric relationship between the two 
internal compradors and their foreign connection. As Mike Douglass 
notes: 
With a benevolent external economy, the dominant and 
almost exclusive Chinese merchant class was able to 
undermine the posture of economic nationalism by assenting 
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to the inclusion of Thai military and bureaucratic elites on the 
boards of their trading companies. Instead of accumulating 
wealth through the construction of state-run enterprises, the 
Thai political elites could claim handsome incomes as 
"directors" of Chinese-run businesses which prospered in an 
open economy.59 
It is the class, ethnic and nationalist rivalry which has been the 
underlying reason for the subsequent military coups and 
authoritarian rule. The paradoxical result is that government 
officials sit on the boards of directors of private enterprises while 
Chinese serve in management of state enterprises and government 
monopolies originally established to keep some economic activity 
out of their hands6' What is argued here is that one of the most 
important reasons for the anti-democratic development of Thai 
society, has been the exclusion of the indigenous Thai business 
sector. The military has been the vanguard of Thai nationalist 
values, not only in order to fight the internal and external 
communist threat but also as a substitute for the non-existing Thai 
bourgeoisie. The two principal contending forces of Thai society 
post-1932 have been the military dominated state bureaucracy and 
the Chinese business sector. 
External Pressures on the Regime-form, State 
Capacities and Policies 
As mentioned earlier, the Thai Kingdom and the state historically 
relied on the big powers to maintain the country's formal 
independence. Sukhumband referring to Girling's precise 
observation,6' makes the point that the patron-client structure of 
internal Thai politics is paralleled by a preference ,for a similar 
relationship in foreign affairs, first with the British against the 
French, next with Japan during the World War 11, and finally, with 
the United  state^.^' 
Among the international determinants American influence is the 
single factor which gives coherence to the social, economic, and 
political history of Thailand since World War ILb3 The Thai military 
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regimes became one of the significant supports behind US strategy 
against communism in Northeast and Southeast Asia.64 
However, once again the Japanese state and zaibatzu have 
replaced the Americans in terms of economic influence. Especially 
since the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese 
economic impact and subsequent political and cultural influence 
have grown tremendously not only in Thailand but in the whole 
area of Northeast and Southeast Asia.65 As Masashi Nishihara, 
attached to the Japanese Defence Agency, notes in a strictly personal 
statement: 
Asians often argue that Japan would protect its extensive 
economic interests in Asia by force, if it were compelled to ... 
Asians suspicious of Japanese behaviour are contradicting 
themselves. If the Japanese were to use force to protect their 
economic interests in Asia, the most effective way to check 
Japanese "militarism" must be for Asian , governments to 
reduce Japanese economic presence in their region. But in 
practice they call for more economic aid and investment from 
Tokyo. Yet, a reduced Japanese economic presence certainly 
means less aid, less investment, and less trade, which in turn 
would adversely affect the economic prosperity of the 
region.'j6 
Adjusting to Japanese neo-mercantilist interests is reflected in Prime 
Minister Chatichai's plan to convert resource-rich Indochina from 
a "battlefield into a trading market." The Thai military leaders want 
to establish similar exploitative relations with Cambodia as they 
have with Burma.67 The Thai aspiration to regional leadership was 
reflected in the Prime Minister's "New Look Diplomacy" which has 
drawn some reservation in other ASEAN capitals. As Um notes, 
"Much of the concern, however, is rooted in Chatichai's own 
penchant for sweeping and controversial rhetoric. One example was 
his proposal for a joint Thai-Japanese naval exercise in the South 
China Sea".'j8 Already in 1989 the major antagonism between 
Chatichai's "no problem" attitude promoting Sino-Thai big business 
interests at the expense of the military and the technocrats, as 
exponents of genuine Thai interests, was highlighted through 
various reports in the press and journals.'j9 
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As part and parcel of American long-term aims in East Asia, 
Thailand from the 1960s on became a cornerstone of this strategy 
fulfilling the function of a buffer state between the free world and 
Asian communism. The hegemonic role of the military within the 
state contributed to the creation and expansion of some successfully 
coherent developmental policies in the post-World War I1 period. 
But this was not an autonomous evolution. In fact, the military was 
institutionalized by American aid, and the subsequent capacities of 
the state agencies were designed in the shadow of American Cold 
War foreign policies.70 
Apart from the US direct predominance through its military 
assistance, the World Bank and other multilateral agencies also 
exerted influence on Thai politics. Grit has compared the authority 
of the World Bank on the regime-form, the state, and the 
subsequent development policies to the consequences of the 
Bowring Treaty in the middle df the nineteenth century.71 The 
World Bank and the United States were, in the case of Thailand, 
"indeed in~eparable."~~ 
Aid, loans, and "policy recommendations", forced the Thai state 
to integrate with the world market.73 And what is more important, 
aid in the form of advice, became the mechanism of the World Bank 
to enhance technical dependency creating a decision-malting process 
external to the peripheral state. This implied an important 
development strategy shift in the late 1970s from predominantly 
import substitution industrialization (ISI) to a policy of export- 
oriented industrialization (EOI) .~~  Paradoxically, another 
consequence of this change in development strategy and macro- 
economic policies is that Thailand still lacks an effective system of 
"screening, negotiating, registering, and monitoring U.S. and any 
foreign direct investment a~tivities."~~ In the early 1980s, the IMF 
and the World Bank were instrumental in pushing Thailand, by 
means of Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs), to restructure its 
economy and reduce the budget deficit and put an end to 
government subsidies on public utilities and oil prices.76 
The last example of technical dependency is connected with the 
crucial question of the missing land reform. Because of the World 
Bank's orthodox position on privatization, the Thai state and 
government have not been encouraged to extend the needed 
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political intervention in the rural economy, and as one observer 
pointed out: 
To permit and facilitate change in agricultural production, 
changes in the social structure and tenure patterns must occur. 
Most of Thailand's farmers do not own their land and, 
therefore, do not qualify for the bank loans necessary to 
stimulate these developments. Will the Thai government give 
the priority for finding these funds? And probably more 
important, will it be courageous enough to do this in 
opposition to the World Bank's orthodox dogma of 
"privatizing" at all 
The essential problem, at least compared with the Japanese model, 
is the missing land reform. 
Nester has provided an important insight with regard to the 
international influence during the period of the late 1940s through 
the 1960s, when Washington and Tokyo worked assiduously to 
reassert Japan's economic presence in Southeast Asia. In this 
dynamic triangular economic relationship, a division of labour was 
agreed upon whereby the United States would provide capital and 
high technology, Japan intermediate goods, and Southeast Asia raw 
materials. In these years, American embassies helped Japanese 
business obtain access to local markets while both American aid and 
Japanese war reparations were tied to purchases of Japanese goods 
and services.78 By the mid-1970s, as the economic development 
continued to advance, Japan replaced the United States as the 
region's most important source of trade, investment and aid. Walter 
Arnold shows that "Japanese economic relations cannot be perceived 
as politically 'neutral'. Instead, they must be seen as instruments of 
influence, power and possibly d~mina t ion ."~~ 
The bulk of foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan and the 
United States until the beginning of the 1980s had gone into import- 
substituting industries. Thereafter a substantial increase of net FDI 
inflows to Thailand went to the export-oriented sector. In Thailand, 
companies with foreign capital involvement are among the largest 
in the country. In the case of Japanese FDI a dependency is 
established with the enterprise in Thailand having to rely on the 
technological know-how and sometimes financial resources of the 
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mother firm. The Japanese shareholders form a powerful group and 
maintain control of the company despite their minority 
share holding^.^' 
The result of Thailand's integration into the world capitalist orbit 
has been a limited, externally determined, political and economic 
capacity and capability, which has created the conditions for 
legitimizing the authoritarian state. As Hewison has noted, "the 
supply of large loans and credits by international agencies and 
private transnational banks gives them a considerable stake in the 
direction of national development and provides international 
finance capital with a strong stimulus to influence development 
p~licies".~' 
State Capacity Versus Autonomy 
To promote economic growth a strong coercive state is necessary, 
and the incorporative mechanism at the ideological and political 
levels has so far functioned rather well. However, from 1973 to 1976 
the state and the military loosened the grip allowing the necessary 
political space for a popular organization of social groups hitherto 
excluded from control over resources and regulative  institution^.^' 
The resulting 1976 massacre recreated the developmental 
paternalism of the state, through what Turton terms "the 
genealogies of violence based on 'a climate of fear' in which violent 
attacks or death by assassination, rather than mere official rebuke 
or arrest, is a possible, ultimate ~anction."'~ 
Although the situation is complicated it seems to be certain that 
the dominant political and cultural matrix of King, Religion and 
Nation, while being the hegemonic ideological legitimation of the 
growth strategy, likewise will determine the necessity of 
authoritarian state policies to promote economic growth. 
Corresponding to the arguments elaborated upon above, although 
external influences on the regime-form and subsequent development 
strategies have been important, the Thai state has played a major 
role in the domestic development of capitalist production. But the 
problem in the case of Thailand is that compared to the Japanese 
Model, as exemplified by MITI strategies in Japan or planning 
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agencies in Korea and Taiwan, which focused on so-called "Sun 
Rise" industries through the implementation of coherent and 
rational industrial policies, the Thai state has not had the same 
capacity to rationalize its economic policies and implement the 
expected goals of any of the five-year plans.84 
The relative weakness of the indigenous classes is reflected in the 
fact that the military and the bureaucracy have come to exert 
decisive control over the state apparatus. In general, the policies of 
repression of labour organizations, subsidies on food and fuel, 
protectionism of small sectors of the economy, investment in 
infrastructure and production have fostered the growth of a 
previously weakly developed indigenous capitalist class. The 
changes in the Thai economy over the last thirty years have been 
spectacular. But in terms of economic policy it was not before 1985, 
when Thailand shifted away from the protected, import-substitution 
strategy of the 1950s, and moved decisively towards export 
orientation that favorable results could be observed.85 Relatively 
developed industrial sectors have been established and exports have 
constantly increased. However, it is questionable whether these 
changes can be attributed to the development strategies per se. 
Rather the policies have to be seen in terms of 'yacilitating changes 
made possible by the development of the international economy."86 
In this context the role of the military dominated state bureaucracy 
has been crucial as a mediator between international and Sino-Thai 
capital interests linked up in the triple alliance of state, Sino-Thai 
capital, and foreign multinational capital. 
Generally speaking, the basic credo underlying the Thai state's 
reformist policy for the past two decades was - and still is - the 
facilitation of the growth of private industries and private 
enterprises through public expenditure (including international 
development aid and loans).87 The idea is to transform Thailand's 
traditional society into a modern industrialized economy in the 
mold of advanced Western capitalism. This can be observed in the 
accumulation strategies (IS1 and EOI) followed by 1) the squeezing 
of Thai agriculture under the name of agricultural and rural 
development; 2) the disciplining of the Thai workforce under the 
justification of economic doctrines of maintaining a comparative 
advantage and a favourable climate for foreign investment; and 3) 
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the opening of the Thai economy and society to foreign capital 
penetration and exploitation under the banner of industrialization 
and economic development. Thus, planning in a Thai context 
facilitates and legitimizes the development of dependent capitalism. 
, Basically, the neoclassical economic development model as well 
as Keynesian economic theories emphasize macro-economic growth 
and industrialization, 'with the support of the agricultural/rural 
sector, and growth is measured in terms of per capita income. This 
development framework is urban-biased and imposes "an economic 
versus noneconomic dichotomy, and de-emphasizes income 
distrib~tion".~~ 
Authoritarian states may maximize their independence from 
society, but they lose capacity and ability due to their failure to 
mobilize public support because of too much stress on coercive 
means of control. Thailand is ruled by shifting, narrowly based 
regimes relying on substantial degrees of control. The result is that 
the state is dominated by powerful groups limiting state ~apacity.~' 
Thai governments come and go, but it does not seem to matter all 
that much, because the military and administrative structure remain 
intact." Over the past four decades, the bureaucracy has been 
controlled through the assignment of military officers to crucial 
positions of authority over civilians and by a continual process of 
coopting bureaucrats to work amiably and effectively for the 
military regime. Thus the military has continually administered 
governmental affairsm9' 
Similarly, authoritarian policies of varying degrees are determined 
by the common interests of the triple alliance which means the Sino- 
Thai local big capital, the military and the bureaucrats in the state 
apparatus and foreign TNCs, multilateral organizations, core states 
like Japan, and to a lesser degree the United States. 
Consequently, democracy in Dahl's definition has not evolved, 
neither at the regime level nor at the actor level because of the 
contradicting interests embedded in the state apparatus. The reasons 
for authoritarian rule are to be found in the policies of legitimizing 
weak state capacities at the overall macro-economic planning and 
implementation level. The high economic growth which on the 
other hand creates enough room for manoeuvre is legitimized 
through a combination of coercive and incorporative capacities, 
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which have political, ideological and cultural elements. In short, 
high economic growth is a determining condition for the 
intervention of a weak state in economic affairs thereby giving it a 
strong capacity to manipulate and incorporate the hitherto excluded 
majority.92 The polity in Thailand is a cultural ethic entity, a nation 
state, based on the ideological triangle King, Nation and Religion as 
the legitimizing space and autonomy for political authoritarianism. 
Democratization From Below Against Thai Style 
Democracy From Above 
The above mentioned aspects are clearly illustrated in events from 
the period of October, 1973 to October, 1976, which is usually 
termed the "Democratic Spring of Thailand" where the legitimizing 
institutions of the state were eroded by the national popular 
elements on three levels. 
First, because of the state squeeze on the majority of the 
population, i.e., the peasants. The unpopular rice premium was one 
of the cornerstones of the capacity of the state to extract resources 
from agriculture for industrial development. This policy instrument 
was geared toward nurturing the accumulation strategies of IS1 and 
EOI, and is quite obviously working against the interests of the rice 
farmers, who account for almost eighty percent of the entire 
population. For historical, political and cultural reasons the capacity 
of the state to implement the rice premium has undoubtedly been 
very effective as a means to achieve social peace in the urban areas 
but simultaneously it is one of the underlying reasons for the 
widespread poverty in rural areas.93 As such the rice premium has 
become the single most controversial policy issue in post-war Thai 
society.94 The attempt to diversify Thai agriculture through the rice 
premium policy, when associated with a bad harvest, by and large 
leads to a rice shortage, as was the case during 1972 and 1973. From 
June 12 to July 30,1973, rice exports were completely prohibited. In 
fact, the 1973 rice crisis, in which the city people had to stand in 
long lines in order to buy rice, became one of the key factors that 
contributed to the fall of the military regime in October 1973. 
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The second factor is the external dominance in the form of 
growing Japanese influence not only in economic terms but also in 
the cultural and political spheres through conditions implied in 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and other kinds of aid 
related measures.95 After the American defeat in Vietnam, the 
withdrawal of US troops from Thai territory left an exhausted home 
market, where the Sino-Thai bourgeoisie and the increasingly 
corrupt bureaucratic-military regime could not find outlets for the 
home production. When the Americans moved out the Japanese 
moved in, gradually coming to dominate the economy in 
collaboration with the military regime. The organizational nodal 
point of the popular forces became related to an anti-imperialist 
demand directed at both representatives of foreign domination and 
hegemony, These developments led to pressures on the state and 
the government to draft a democratic constitution. 
Finally, it can be argued that the legitimacy of the politico- 
cultural matrix as described above came to a critical point after two 
decades of martial law and dictatorial rule. The popular movement, 
with the students as the vanguard, rejected deep-rooted Sakdina 
values and ideologies and the inertia of parliamentary "Thai-style 
democracy" as well as the inefficiency of the b~reaucracy.'~ The 
crisis of legitimacy expressed itself through the breakdown of the 
dominant national politico-cultural discourse - paternalism. The 
reasons for this evolution were connected to what we have chosen 
to term the process of democratization from below and on the other 
hand the missing capability and capacity of state hegemony to 
implement coherence within the coercive and incorporative policies, 
which could have preserved the social and cultural persistence of 
the regime's legitimacy. 
Regardless of the fact that all examples of democratization from 
below in Thailand had different contexts their thrust was directed 
at the state. This shows that the key question remains power over 
the various state capacities. But in accordance with the theoretical 
sketch the main point to be emphasized is indeed that the 
overthrow of the military regime should be seen as a move and a 
process of democratization from below which achieved a three year 
period (1973-76) with significant changes at the regime level. 
However, it did not change the state apparatus. Hence, the military 
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dominated bureaucracy remained intact. And in fact, the result of 
the period of democratic Spring was a bloody and violent massacre 
in downtown Bangkok and the introduction of a new military 
regime. 
In the beginning of the 1980s, the military introduced a new 
strategy. From then on it based its legitimacy on "Thai Style 
Democracy", an old concept with a new content. This new policy 
must be seen in relation to the introduction of Export Oriented 
Industrialization (EOI) together with growing state interventionism 
in all spheres of society and production. The new activities in the 
rural areas were named COIN, which stands for counter insurgency 
programmes against the armed Communist Party. Described as 
"development programmes" which include a proliferation of social 
surveillance and controls with "democracy" and "participation" as 
policy catchwords, the government strategy seems in effect to 
resemble the Indonesian state's New Order with a "floating mass 
strategy of preventing rural population from engaging in organized 
political activity."97 
But it is not only the means of violence that are under the control 
of the military. Even though the IMF and World Bank "advised" 
Thailand to embark on a comprehensive privatization programme 
in 1984, in 1991 the process was still proceeding extremely slowly. 
As the Far Eastern Economic Review noted in June, 199198 much of the 
recent progress in privatization had been carried out under the 
discredited government of Chatichai Choonhavan. Accusations of 
corruption over certain public-private ventures, together with a 
privatization tussle with the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT), set the scene for the February 1991 military coup 
which brought about Chatichai's demise as prime minister. The 
military's longstanding role in state enterprises is unlikely to 
diminish much in the near future. The military regards its influence 
on the boards of state firms as important for national security, as 
well as providing the military with access to benefits that would 
otherwise be unavailable for badly paid soldiers. Their boardroom 
presence is established both by tradition and legal right. Among the 
20 state enterprises, 26 percent of board members are reported to be 
acting or retired military officers. Leaving aside the four state banks, 
which have no military representation, the figure rises to 32 percent. 
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Board seats enable the military to find state-enterprise sinecures for 
retiring military personnel, to direct purchase contracts to military 
linked suppliers, and to award service contracts to friendly 
companies. 
The military has institutionalized the means of mobilizing the 
masses in support of the government (when appropriate), individual 
leaders, the military's national security programme, etc. Some of 
these institutions are the Capital Peace Keeping Force, the Civil 
Affairs Centre, the Directorate of Civil Affairs of the Royal Thai 
Army, etc. Concerning these institutions Sukhumband Paribatra has 
argued: 
These, together with other institutions and agencies directly 
controlled by or closely related to the military, such as the 
Senate, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), the 
National Defence Volunteers and the Village Scouts, give the 
Thai armed forces a high degree of capability to conduct mass 
psychological operations, to instill what is euphemistically 
referred to as "a sense of responsibility" in the public 
consciousness, and indeed, to gain crucial or perhaps decisive 
support for the military when necessary and appropriate. For 
the latter such involvements are "legitimate" for there is no 
dividing line between national security, politics, government 
services and military affairs. To illustrate these institutional 
developments impressive figures of state expenses show that 
over one-fifth goes to the military."99 
In short, the military and the state have incorporated the population 
much more efficiently in order to strengthen the new politico- 
cultural hegemony and social order. This is, paradoxically, a 
fulfilment of David Wilson's thesis that Thailand's development 
problem in 1962 was a matter of bringing the state machinery under 
some disciplining power.loO 
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Crisis and Control: a Comparative Perspective on 
October 1973 and May 1992 
On October 5, 1973, confrontations between the military and the 
National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT) culminated in front of 
the Democracy Monument in Bangkok when a student made a 
speech naming more than 100 prominent public personalities as 
signatories of a statement demanding a new democratic 
c o n s t i t ~ t i o n . ~ ~ ~  
Prior to this culmination, a number of demonstrators had been 
arrested for inciting the public to rise against the government. The 
NSCT had organised boycott campaigns against Japanese products 
and protests against the control of the military over the rule of law, 
regularization, and constitutionalism.102 In the end, the NSCT 
decided to draft a constitution themselves.lo3 On October 14, which 
later became known as the "Day of Tragedy" or "Bloody Sunday", 
riot police and the students clashed in violent fighting and later on 
the army moved in. Many people were killed.lo4 Subsequently, the 
king stepped in to control the situation by asking Thanom, Prapas, 
and Narong to leave the country. Given the refusal of General 
Srivara, the army chief, to stand on their side they had no 
alternative left but to comply. 
"The other revolution", as Girling calls these events, was indeed 
revolutionary in the sense that it started as an intellectual-based 
movement, but it came to deal with concrete problems and the 
conditions of the masses. It challenged the power structure of the 
privileged groups and it resulted in the release of economic and 
social forces which had taken shape during the past two decades.lo5 
At the same time, it aimed at a complete break with the ruling 
political culture - paternalist developmentalism - and its deeply 
rooted Sakdina values and ideologies, i.e., the patron-client 
relationship in politics and economics, as well as in foreign affairs. 
On this basis, it is possible to view the movement, the NSCT, and 
other components as "a democratic force opposing elitist dictatorial 
rule and aspiring to develop a new democratic and creative political 
culture."lo6 
However, the 1973 coup could also be interpreted as a triumph 
for those elements of the Sino-Thai business sector who, in fact, 
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used the student movement and popular resentment as a visible 
front for the realization of their own interests. For a couple of years 
after the 1973 revolution, there was a wave of liberal optimism, 
which was ultimately undermined by the bloody coup of 1976. 
Interestingly, the amount of foreign investment declined 
considerably during the 1973-1976 period.lo7 On the other hand, the 
three year period of "open politics" made the unhampered growth 
of trade unions and their activities possible. The number of strikes 
increased rapidly from 34 in 1972 to 501 in 1973,357 in 1974,241 in 
1975, and 133 in 1976.1°8 Also the number of political parties 
virtually exploded at the time of the first democratic national 
election in 1975 when 44 parties contested the 269 seats in the 
House. of Representatives and 22 achieved representation.lo9 
Moreover, the free press became vocal while the other media turned 
increasingly political. The democratic mood seemed all-embracing. 
The major problem arose immediately after the election in 1975 
as none of the 22 political parties were able to form a government 
on its own. This led to a coalition between 17 parties lasting only 
one year, when a new election was called. This came about as a 
result of heavy pressure from the military in order to 'prevent a 
socialist-oriented government, unacceptable to the military, from 
coming to power. The 1976 election was marred with violence 
claiming many lives.l1° The socialist-oriented candidates of the New 
Force, Socialist and United Front parties together with student 
activists became the prime target of harassment, intimidation and 
violence by military-sponsored rightist groups. The result of 
heightened political tensions led to the electoral rejection of the 
socialist-oriented parties, and the formation of a new unstable 
coalition government contributed to the outbreak of the Thammasat 
massacre and the military coup of October 6,1976. Democracy was 
again laid to rest as the 1974 constitution was revoked and 
parliament dissolved on the advocacy of the National 
Administrative Reform Council, appointed by the king, that the 
enemies of the nation were attempting to sabotage the stability of 
the kingdom, the throne and the national economy. 
The pattern that followed the events prior to and afte~ the period 
of open politics could also be observed during the period leading 
up to the "Black May" massacre in 1992. After Suchinda overthrew 
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the Chatichai government in February 1991 in a bloodless coup the 
first move was to ban unions in state enterprises among the 200,000 
employees. 
As reported in the media about 50,000 people demonstrated on 
May 4, 1992, against the appointment of General Suchinda 
Kraprayoon as prime minister. The general, who toppled Prime 
Minister Chatichai in a 1991 coup, took over on April 7. The 
demonstration followed a rally which had taken place on April 20, 
with the participation of more than 50,000 people.'" A number of 
petitions were submitted to the king asking him to intervene. The 
rallies culminated in a big demonstration on May 17 with 200,000 
demanding a revision of the con~titution.~'~ 
American newspapers had some comments to make after the 
massacre in Bangkok. The United States had lived comfortably with 
military rule in Thailand for many decades. More recently, 
Washington had sought to display some of the same devotion to 
democratic values in Thailand that it had asserted in less strategic 
places; it suspended aid, for instance, after the coup. Still, the latest 
events caught the US government in the embarrassing 
circumstances of conducting joint military exercises with the Thai 
army. 
An editorial in the International Herald Tribune stated that it was 
now up to the Thai leaders, especially King Bhumipol Adulyadej, 
to resolve the crisis by re-establishing democratic rule with the 
United States also playing a useful role. It had suspended most 
forms of cooperation with the regime. Now it needed to denounce 
General Suchinda in the strongest terms. Words matter in Thailand, 
"especially when Washington is their source."113 However, Japan the 
largest aid donor accounting for over three-quarters of aid to 
Thailand, did not consider suspending assistance. "We regard the 
Suchinda government as a legitimate, constitutional government", 
a senior official of Japan's foreign ministry said.'14 
On May 21 the King emerged from isolation to mediate what 
appeared to be a solution to the crisis which had cost at least 100 
lives. But that number was still disputed at the end of 1992. As the 
Bangkok Post noted, "Gen. Suchinda may be out, but the military 
that supported him remains one of the key institutions of power in 
the country."'15 
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In 1981 Morel1 and Chai-Anan asked: "Is Thailand ready for 
democracy as part of an institutional and attitudinal response to its 
identity crisis? In terms of alien Western structures and procedures 
alone, the answer remains rather firmly negative, nearly five 
decades after such forms were first introduced. Another set of 
superficial, irrelevant constitutions and formalistic elections of 
politicians to a remote, impotent but interventionist parliament in 
Bangkok surely cannot contribute very much to resolving Thailand's 
political crisis."116 
Tentative Perspectives on State and Democracy in a 
Developmental Context 
The approach suggested in this article follows a state-centred line 
of argumentation by focusing on the dialectic of the processes of 
democracy and democratization combined with an eclectic view on 
internal and external determinants together with an emphasis on 
history. The case from Thailand, at least, confirms the initial 
theoretical consideration: there is no simple correlations between 
development and democracy.l17 
As far as the evolution of Thailand is concerned, it does not 
require clairvoyance to imagine in retrospect that the events of the 
last few years will result in a more realist interpretation of 
Bangkok's economic boom. There will be a sharp deterioration of 
the domestic budget and external trade balances, a resumption of 
foreign indebtedness, higher inflation, a move to "distort" domestic 
economic policy by adopting "nationalist" (i.e. anti-Chinese) 
p01icies.l~~ Sporadic nationalist reactions under past Thai regimes in 
this century made little long-lasting impact on communal feelings; 
today the only restrictive entry practices left seem to be at the 
Chullachomkhlao military academy, which continues excluding 
cadets born of first or second generation immigrants. The largely 
amicable ethnic coexistence, enhanced by frequent intermarriage, 
may not endure indefinitely, however. The rapacity that led to the 
wrecking of Thailand's forests and coastal resources usually carries 
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a Chinese face, say Thai critics, in an allusion to the overwhelming 
Sino-Thai interests in the companies that have been involved in the 
destruction of Thailand's vast forests. Other local chauvinists see a 
Chinese hand behind the biggest banks and finance companies, 
prompting occasional mutterings from younger military officers. 
General Chaovalit, before becoming leader of the New Aspiration 
Party, occasionally made slightly veiled appeals to indigenous 
resentment vis-8-vis the Chinese; up to the end of the 1980s, 
however, these undercurrents normally had limited influence.l19 
The internal evolution can also be influenced by external 
fluctuations in global economic and political structures; the growing 
tendency towards protectionist mercantilism in the core states, i.e., 
Japan, United States and the EEC., can lead (as a response) to 
growing authoritarianism and less space for democratization from 
below. The state is likely to increase its capacity by manipulating 
and mobilizing the Thai people, as its elites, the triple alliance, run 
the country autonomously according to the concept of "the state 
shall lead, not serve the people." 
With approximately 80 percent of a population of 55 million 
residing in rural areas, Thailand offers, indeed, a case of extreme 
d ~ a 1 i s m . l ~ ~  Therefore support from the non-urban populace is at the 
heart of the struggle for political power. Whoever controls the rural 
vote gets political leverage over all other groups. At present, the 
bureaucrats within the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the military 
have that monop01y.l~~ It means that whoever is in control of the 
state apparatus has the power to handle rural forces. As Maisrikrod 
and Limsong conclude, "the dominance of the military-bureaucratic 
alliance over the businessmen-politicians is, unlike democracy, 
deeply rooted in Thailand's political culture."122 This interpretation 
is confirmed by Turton's extensive studies of power relation 
between the state and the rural population: even if there is a certain 
personal syncretism between military and other bureaucrats with 
the Sino-Thai business sector, "the military possess its own relative 
autonomy ... a momentum of its own somewhat hybrid, parasitic, 
'secondary complex of predatory  interest^'."'^^ 
It is precisely this symbiotic relationship between a relatively 
autonomous military, civil bureaucrats in uniform, the state and the 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt 
Sino-Thai business sector that essentially has to be broken before 
paternalist developmentalism fades away as the basis of the political 
system in Thailand. Furthermore, the external dimension must be 
taken into consideration to provide an understanding of the 
perception of this triple alliance, and its practice of favouring an 
authoritarian developmental policy, which is deemed necessary to 
enhance the export-driven growth strategy. 
This is also the theme of the "later-comer" and "catch up" debate 
about developmental (soft) authoritarianism as a prerequisite for 
industrialization, economic growth and "modernization". Roman 
Szporluk concludes in his interesting contribution to the marxist 
versus nationalist controversy on economic policy that it is indeed 
true that the Third World today is "Listian in its The 
"young" Chalmers Johnson claimed in his book Revolutionary Change, 
which came out in the same period as Huntington's Political Order 
in Changing Societies that, "the process of social and economic 
change in the Third World was considered to produce a 
disintegrative interregnum which required a strong authoritarian 
rule to achieve political reintegration and economic development."125 
These two American political scientists' "advice," not only became 
reality in Thailand, as emphasized in this article, but was in fact 
institutionalized to cement paternalist developmentalism, and to 
cope with the so-called "demand overload" problem. It is precisely 
this built-in-heritage, the spontaneous popular movement toppled 
in May 1992. 
The regime-form in Thailand cannot be defined as democracy or 
autocracy, neither in functionalist terms nor in the idealist form in 
Dahl's version. This is so not only because of the role of the military 
but also on account of the rules and regulations as stated in the law 
implemented by the Sarit regime in the 1950s. Rather, the regime- 
form can best be characterized as an authoritarian developmental 
state, conditioned by the internal cleavage in the authoritarian triple 
alliance between the predominantly Chinese bourgeoisie, the civil 
and military bureaucracy, and the impact of external forces 
(primarily American) on these two groups. 
This specific relationship between the state and the macro- 
economic actors at the national and international level is reflected 
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in the shifting balance of power in the triple alliance and has been 
the underlying cause for the way state power and state form has 
been created in Thailand. It does not, on the other hand, connote 
any causal relationship between the regime-form, type of state, state 
power, state form and the question of democratization from below. 
In Thailand, as in many other near-NICs, it means the subordination 
and the exclusion of any political forces from below in the process 
of democratization. Not only on the political level but also with 
regard to economic and social rights. This means, finally, that the 
four structural capacities of the state in Thailand have a great 
impact on increasing the relative autonomy of the state, which is the 
most important prerequisite for developmentalism and authoritarian 
policies. As long as the military more or less controls these 
capacities, the stability of economic policy and non-democratic 
developmental practice are secured for years to come. Constitutions 
come and constitutions go, but in the end, the military and the 
bureaucracy have the final say. Therefore, as we have seen in the 
months after the military regime was toppled in May 1992, the new 
care-taker Anand and his democraticly elected followers, have not 
only tried to get the army back to the barracks, but out of the 
bureaucracy, lucrative government monopolies, parastals and 
business, legal and illegal activities, as well. It remains to be seen 
whether the newly elected democratic government will be able to 
change the structures of the state bureaucracy. As an observer 
pointed out after the February 1991 coup, as a preliminary measure 
to break with authoritarian rule, "the next government needs to 
ponder the relocation of major military units out of Bangkok, and 
launch a two-pronged effort to divide and co-opt the military. This 
could be done by actively soliciting the loyalty and respect of 
officers who command key regiments."lZ6 
The final question is not, as mistakenly claimed by some 
observers, who will carry out the "historical mission" (i.e. the 
development of democracy) in Thailand. But rather, since 
democracy is such a relative concept, the most crucial question has 
to be "whose democracy and under whose hegemony". The events 
of the infamous Black May incident should not lead to the 
conclusion that the role of the military in Thai politics and state 
affairs is over. In fact, as argued in this paper, history has shown 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt  
the necessity for strong government - with or without the military 
- in guiding the economy and achieving sustained high economic 
growth. 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt is a Research Fellow at the International 
Studies Center, Aalborg University, Denmark. 
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